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1

Introduction
In this paper, I intend to inform readers about the current financial crisis in urban
inner-city communities. The high levels of concentrated poverty created a pattern of delayed
economic growth in these communities and diminished any form of social mobility. The spatial
organization and class transformations of the urban inner-city greatly limited accessibility to a
plethora of resources, specifically access to sound financial institutions. The current spatial
organization of the urban inner-city was developed through disinvestment and redlining
techniques. Disinvestment is a series of progressive steps by which different mainstream
institutions, such as banks and credit unions, remove themselves from neighborhoods they expect
to deteriorate. The reasoning behind depriving communities of these necessary institutions is
profit; the investment in high-risk areas is equivalent to mismanagement of depositors’ funds and
is ultimately counterproductive, both for the depositor and for the lending institution.1 The
geographical outlay has caused barriers within the inner city and plays a vital role in the
economic well-being and social progression of the inhabitants of these inner-city “ghetto
communities.” I intend to analyze the spatial organization and disinvestment methods in The
Bronx, which is the poorest congressional district in the United States, and the detrimental social
and economic effects of the prohibited accessibility to viable mainstream economic institutions.
The Bronx is known for having the highest underbanked population, poverty rates,
unemployment level, and lowest median incomes within New York City. 2 The economic decline
the Bronx suffered from was due in part to disinvestment and redlining by both the federal
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Cassandra J. Harvard, “Doin’ Banks,” University of Pennsylvania Journal of Law and Public Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 3
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government and wealthy investors. After World War II, the Bronx became more and more
racially diverse and fell victim to “white flight,” which can be defined as the sudden migration of
white residents of an area to escape diversity.
Predatory financial practices have caused the Bronx to become one of the most
underbanked and underserved communities in the country. Many members of The Bronx
community have been unable to access banks or credit, which has only deepened the continuous
cycles of poverty within this community. In my research, I will be analyzing the extent to which
the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), a law passed that encourages regulated financial
institutions to help meet the credit needs of their entire communities, has been applicable to
highly concentrated poverty in urban areas, specifically The Bronx. Many banks have “redlined”
entire areas of American cities as places where they would not lend. Deregulation trends caused
the federal government to play a huge role in shutting out inner-city neighborhoods from
traditional sources of credit. The Bronx needs government and social investment in order to
revitalize its economy. I propose that applying methods of public banking will remedy the lack of
financial inclusion in the Bronx, which has caused the continuous cycle of poverty found within
the borough. I will address the current limitations of the CRA, its applicability, and the ways in
which the CRA can be improved to adequately address the current issue of the underbanked
population in The Bronx.

3

Chapter 1: Identifying the Problem: Fringe Banking
In the United States, over a quarter of Americans are financially excluded from the
traditional banking system and arguably economically unstable.3 The U.S. financial services
sector is based on a two-tiered system: the traditional “mainstream” system and the alternative
“fringe” system.4 The “average” American depends on the services of the mainstream financial
system in order to cash checks, deposit and withdraw money, and access credit. The mainstream
system is composed of regulated financial institutions, such as banks and credit unions. The
alternative “fringe” financial system serves a variety of credit and payment options to largely low
and moderate-income households, who barely interact with the formal banking system.5 The
fringe banking system upholds different financial services distributed by non-traditional financial
institutions, such as check cashers, payday lenders, and pawnshops. The two-tiered financial
system of formal and informal banks is often justified based on rational choice, meaning
individuals opt to use fringe banks.6 Although most of the individuals who utilize fringe services
have the least amount of income and rarely participate in the formal banking economy; these
users tend to pay higher interest rates and fees associated with business transaction costs than
individuals who utilize the formal banking economy. If the consumer has a rational choice to
save money in the long run, then why pay such high costs? The high-cost products and services
of fringe banks are justified as filling a void in the regulatory system.7 But this “void” in the
formal banking system leaves people who primarily utilize fringe services vulnerable to
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continuous financial distress and highlights a major discrepancy within the formal banking
system. Although individuals have a “choice” to bank formally, there is not always an accessible
route to access banking services for all consumers. This void of fringe banking exemplifies the
inability of mainstream banks to offer accessible products to disadvantaged communities.
The popularization of the fringe system was due to a mix of political, economic, and
regulatory forces that put pressure on states to loosen interest rate caps. Federal monetary policy
centered around deregulation tactics, which were set to control inflation by increasing long-term
commercial interest rates. This allowed banks and lenders to weaken rate caps of interest rates to
attract consumers. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, other regulatory changes allowed banks to
diversify their investment activities and expand across state lines, contributing to growth and
consolidation in the financial sector.8 By removing previous restrictions, deregulation increased
competition within banks, saving banks, and credit unions. Banks are profit-driven; thus,
deregulation influenced many mainstream banks to close their branches in non-profitable
neighborhoods, specifically low-income urban communities. Traditionally, low-income
individuals used credit unions, and saving banks that were found within their communities, but
since the consolidation of the banking sector, many turned to fringe services for their short-term
financial needs.

Check Cashing Outlets
Check-cashing outlets were originally designed to serve consumers who did not have a
traditional bank account.9 Check-cashing outlets grew convenient and served low-income
8

Jerzy Eisenberg-Guyot et. al, “From Payday Loans To Pawnshops: Fringe Banking, The Unbanked, And Health,”
Health Affairs Vol. 37, No. 3 (2018): 430, https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.2017.1219.
9
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Relationship between Fringe Banking and Neighborhood Crime Rates,” Justice Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 5 (2014): 3,
https://doi.org/10.1080/07418825.2014.959036.
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communities as the deregulation of the banking industry resulted in higher fees to maintain a
low-balance deposit account at mainstream banking services.10 Check-cashing outlets (CCO) are
the most commonly used fringe financial services.11 The main function of a CCO is to provide
liquidity and access to cash in a speedy fashion. CCO services allow individuals to cash payroll,
personal, and government checks for a fee; therefore, consumers pay a percentage of the face
value of checks to get them cashed.12 Aside from check cashing, there are other convenient
payment services that CCOs offer such as “utility and bill pay services, money transfer services,
small consumer loans, money orders, telecommunications products (prepaid long-distance
calling cards), automatic check-cashing machines, and other services such as fax transmissions
(send and receive), copy services, postage stamps, and envelopes, notary services, mailboxes,
and lottery ticket sales.”13
Unlike traditional banking services that cover almost all payment services, CCOs charge
a direct fee for their payment services. While check-cashing outlets cash more than 180 million
checks worth more than $55 billion annually, there is a fee of 2.52% is typically charged to cash
paychecks but service fees can reach as high as 5%.14 Check-cashing outlets extract the majority
of revenue from check-cashing fees. In order to provide cash advances on checks that still need
to be cleared, CCOs use higher interest rates to compensate for cash checks that will be
uncollectible due to insufficient funds or fraud. “People are willing to pay higher discount rates
to advance the date of payment than they are willing to pay to delay the date of loss.”15 The
10

Christopher Choe, “Bringing the Unbanked off the Fringe:The Bank on San Francisco Model and the Need for
Public and Private Partnership,” Seattle Journal for Social Justice Vol. 8, No. 1 (2009): 369,
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liquidity options of check-cashing outlets attract desperate consumers that must finance
short-term obligations.
Check-cashing outlets utilize prepaid debit cards as a costly bank account substitute.16
Outlets usually charge an activation fee and a fee for every time the card is refilled. This
alternative is used when individuals cannot afford to utilize a checking account or do not have
access to a formal banking institution. Banking at CCO can be costly for consumers, “Instead of
keeping money in an insured account, check-cashing patrons carry cash unless they pay to load
check proceeds onto a high-fee card or pay for a money order to hold cash.”17 Prepaid cards
allow the consumer to have some discrepancy, but there is a larger transaction cost.
Another primary function of the CCO is to distribute payday loans. These informal
“loans” are postdated checks lent to consumers based on their payday salary; consumers receive
part of their total paycheck in immediate cash from outlets. Although it is called a payday “loan,”
these advancements are considered delayed check cashing transactions rather than short-term
consumer loans. Check-cashing outlets utilize payday loans as most banks would utilize an
unsecured loan since no collateral is needed. Payday loans were initially used to cover
short-term, unforeseen costs and minimal cash-flow shortages; for instance, overdraft fees. There
are very few requirements to be applicable for a payday loan; a borrower must have a bank
account, identification, and a source of income, but is not required to demonstrate an ability to
repay or possession of sound credit.18 Although this can be beneficial to individuals with no
sound possession of credit, payday loans often carry a very high rate of interest, upwards of
400% annual percentage rate.19 Check cashing facilities do not report timely payments of payday
16

Fox, “Fringe Bankers,” 138.
Fox, “Fringe Bankers,” 140.
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loans to credit unions; therefore, the borrower does not have the ability to build mainstream
credit or even establish a credit history.20
The structure of payday loans consequently favors payday lenders. Any lenders' sole
objective would be to collect the debt owed to them; but, since payday lenders do not have to
worry about their consumers' ability to repay, payday loans can usually carry excessive prices,
prolonged terms, and unaffordable payments.21 According to the Consumer Federation of
America, at the end of 2010, payday lenders extended $29.2 billion in loan volume annually,
with $4.7 billion in revenue for loans made by payday lenders.22 Payday lenders do not operate
under the same regulations as mainstream banking services; thus, consumers are left vulnerable.
Although some federal policies are put in place to protect consumers from loan discrepancies,
such as the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) which ensures any financial institution is providing
transparent disclosure of loan terms, policies are too broad and poorly implemented to ensure the
protection of borrowers.23 Typically, payday loan borrowers, who are already low to
moderate-income consumers, must continue to borrow to pay loan debt and other financial
obligations; thus, deepening the consumer into a never-ending cycle of debt. “To more closely
align the interests of borrowers and lenders, state policymakers should ensure that these loans are
safe and affordable by limiting monthly payments to 5 percent of a borrower’s gross
paycheck.”24 Protecting consumers' ability to repay will ensure a consistent, successful, and
timely repayment. Although borrowers might save more by depositing checks and waiting, their
20

Hamilton, “Why The Check Cashers Win,” 127.
“Payday Loans Cost 4 Times More in States With Few Consumer Protections,” The PEW Charitable Trusts, April
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preference to pay a fee and obtain the cash instantly may always depend on choice, but a
necessity. The viable access to quick cash helps low-income individuals reach urgent financial
needs, but the high annual percentage rate traps consumers giving a hefty return on investment to
fringe lenders.
Check-cashing outlets serve an underrepresented segment of the market; low and
moderate-income households. “CCOs are disproportionately located in low-income areas…New
York State Banking Department found that 69 percent of CCOs in NYC were located in
low-income census tracts.”25 This disproportion can be attributed to the fact that the sector of
fringe banking allows individuals who don’t have access to a bank account to have quick access
to cash by paying higher fees. “Despite industry claims to the contrary, fringe banking is not
cheap. The average payday loan of $325 with a term of two weeks and at the average interest
rate of 16% costs the typical payday loan customer $52. This translates into an annual percentage
rate (APR) of 400%. The short term of the loan period (two weeks is the industry standard) and
the inability to pay in installments, means that borrowers are often unable to cover the check at
the end of the loan term.”26 CCOs offer more accessible hours and locations. Check cashers can
present themselves to be more convenient as they are often open early in the morning, late into
the evening, and on both weekend days. In comparison to mainstream banks, which have fixed
hours of operation, check-cashing outlets are more accessible to the low and moderate-income,
working-class population; consumers may not have the flexibility to leave work to cash a check
or whose working hours extend beyond the traditional 9 am-5 pm schedule.27 While formal
banking institutions close earlier in the day, some check-cashing outlets can run on a 24-hour
basis. In addition to hours of operation, check-cashing outlets are frequently found in
25

Caskey, Fringe Banking, 65.
Cover, Spring, and Kleit, “Minorities on the Margins? The Spatial Organization of Fringe Banking Services,” 319.
27
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low-income communities, specifically in the inner city. It is more convenient for these
individuals to go to check-cashing facilities down the street, rather than a bank located on a
completely different side of town.
Liquidity options, accessible hours, and high spatial concentration allow for
check-cashing outlets to provide short-term convenience to low and moderate-income borrowers;
but there are long-term detrimental effects of solely relying on check-cashing outlets.
Check-cashing outlets offer minimal opportunities to build assets, wealth, and savings, which are
crucial to an individual’s financial well-being.28 Unlike banks, which enable consumers to save,
outlets serve as a one-stop shop for urgent financial needs. Although convenient, outlets' inability
to offer credit-building opportunities or proper consumer protection can lead to the exploitation
of low to moderate-income consumers.

Payday Loans
As previously mentioned, payday loans are “cash loans” based on the customer's personal
check held for future deposit by the check casher.29 There are limited requirements to receive a
payday loan; most consumers can take out a loan if they have a checking account, a steady job,
and no history of writing bad checks. Payday loans offer an easy way to obtain a short-term loan;
since most formal bank institutions no longer offer short-term loans, consumers have nowhere
else to turn besides payday lenders.30 “In 2015, 12 million Americans took out payday loans each
year and spent $7 billion on loan fees. Though the interest rates commonly are disguised as fees,
they effectively range from 300%-500% annual percentage rate (APR)”31 Although when
annualized, interest rates on payday loans are well in excess of the rates for conventional bank
28

Hamilton, “Why The Check Cashers Win,” 126.
Hamilton, “Why The Check Cashers Win,” 126.
30
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loans, which compare at “15% to 30% APR on credit cards or 10% to 25% rate for a personal
loan from a bank or credit union in 2015.”32
The majority of payday loan customers do not qualify for credit cards or other traditional
forms of credit; therefore, payday loan institutions typically satisfy the short-term need for cash
advances in many communities33 Consumers who routinely utilize fringe banking services are
more exposed to the high fees associated with borrowing money. Payday loan borrowers are
more likely to fall into a debt trap due to the culmination of high cost, check holding, short
repayment terms, and ability to pay.34 Payday lending outlets serve as an indicator of community
economic distress, as loans can portray that community members do not have short-term funds
easily accessible. Payday lending resembles a double-edged sword: While lenders may serve a
crucial financial need within underrepresented communities, lending evidently contributes to the
“poverty penalty” which only exaggerates these communities' financial insecurity.35 “The
borrower has three options after obtaining the loan. First, the borrower can pay back the lender
the face value of the check with cash. Second, the borrower can simply allow the lender to
deposit the check on the specified date. Third, if the borrower cannot pay back the lender on the
specified date, many states allow the borrower to extend the loan another two weeks. This
extension is called a “rollover” of the payday loan. If the borrower were to roll-over his loan
three times, it would cost $60 to borrow $100.”36 The consumer must not only pay the loan back
but also receive extremely high interest on the total of almost $160 that the consumer must pay
back. “The average borrower has eight to nine loans per year from a single lender.”37 These
32
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explicit fees often lead to a cycle of debt for the borrower. Borrowers of payday loans end up
with a tremendous amount of debt accumulated without many options to repay.
There are serious repercussions for customers who fail to repay debt. If a borrower
cannot repay the loan, it may be turned over to a collection agency and may result in the eventual
loss of a house, car, or the garnishing of wages.38 “Many payday loan customers do not qualify
for credit cards or other traditional forms of credit. Thus, payday loan institutions fulfill the need
for cash advances in many communities.”39 Without the ability to rely on a consumer’s credit
score to predict whether they will repay loans, lenders must shape the payday loan structure to
ensure they will get paid. As all of the “risk” is placed solely upon lenders, high fees and interest
rates absorb consumers' limited purchasing power; thus, leaving customers vulnerable to lenders'
decision-making. Although payday loans fill the needed service of short-term cash advances
within underserved communities, municipal-level policies targeting the protection of fringe
consumers are necessary to ensure that risk is properly distributed between lender and borrower.
Nonetheless, the irrevocable presence of payday lenders signals a financial hazard within these
underrepresented communities and serves as a signal to residents of the economic uncertainty
which surrounds them.40

Pawnshops
A pawn shop loan is a relatively straightforward transaction. A pawnbroker makes a
fixed-term loan to a customer who leaves collateral as a guarantee. “The customer is given a
pawn ticket that includes their name, address, a description of the pledged goods, the amount
lent, the maturity date, and the amount that must be repaid to reclaim the property.”41 Property is
38
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returned once the customer gives their receipt and pays their debt, which may include additional
fees within the specific time period. If the loan is not repaid on the exact date agreed upon, the
collateral instantly becomes the property of the broker and the customer’s debt is extinguished.42
Pawn Shops provide small, fast loans primarily to customers with bad credit histories, low
incomes, and high debt-to-income ratios.43
Similar to check-cashing outlets, pawnshops primarily serve and are spatially
concentrated in low-income areas. Consumers in these areas are typically excluded from
financial company loans due to the fact that they cannot pass credit-risk screening or obtain an
unsecured bank credit card. Pawn Shops allow individuals to raise a certain amount of cash to
meet expenditures with full discretion, convenience, and minimal questions asked.

Financial Distress in the Inner City: The Underbanked and Unbanked Population
Low-income consumers who traditionally utilize the fringe banking system, are known as
the unbanked and underbanked population. The unbanked are individuals, families, or
households who do not participate in mainstream bank services or have any affiliation with
banking institutions. Six percent of adults in 2019 did not have a relationship with a bank (no
checking account), savings institution, credit union, or other mainstream financial service
providers.44 On the other hand, the underbanked are considered individuals who hold a bank
account but rely primarily on Alternative Financial Services(AFS). 45 Sixteen percent of adults in
2019 had a bank account but heavily used an alternative financial service product.46
42
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The Alternative Financial Service industry is a multi-billion dollar for-profit institution.
Approximately one-quarter (24.0 percent) of American households reported using AFS in
2015.47 Payday lenders, for example, are now more common in the United States than
Mcdonald's and Starbucks, combined.48 The continuous growth of the alternative financial
institutional “fringe” system is based on the “financialization of the American economy and
extraction of money from the poor through a tiered system of financial service provision”49 The
spacial and social organization of the fringe banking institution has conveniently formed around
moderate to low-income consumers. Most unbanked and underbanked report the reasons they do
not have a checking account and utilize fringe banking are: “(1) they do not write enough checks
to warrant one, (2) they have almost no month-to-month financial savings to keep in them, (3)
they cannot afford high bank fees, (4) they cannot meet high minimum bank balance
requirements, (5) they desire to keep their financial records private, and (6) they experience
discomfort in dealing with banks.”50
John Caskey believed that low income is the causation for the decrease in bank accounts
amongst the unbanked and underbanked.51 Aside from internal structural changes within the
banking system, such as the closing of bank branches; most impoverished populations do not
have the income to withstand a bank account. Caskey identified several social changes that led to
lower income for the poor, including the loss of low-skilled jobs, increased immigration, and an
increase in single-parent homes.52 In 2019, 14 percent of black adults and 10 percent of Hispanic
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adults were unbanked, versus 6 percent of adults overall.53 As consumers, low-income
individuals are making the choice to use fringe banking, but have limited income and
accessibility to other mainstream financial institutions. While the presence of an alternative
financial lender does not directly measure its use by those living in the neighborhood, it does
represent a financial hazard and functions as both a signal and aggravating factor of economic
distress in those communities.54

The Influence of Social Organization and Redlining on the Fringe Banking System
Although fringe banking may seem to be filling a void for formal banks, fringe services
only increase social exclusion and financial instability for the unbanked and underbanked
population. “The Spatial Void Hypothesis” to analyze the extent to which fringe providers
exploit the market niche that is vacated (or left vacant) by traditional providers, a niche that
primarily serves low-income households and minorities by locating in those communities.”55
Since banks are leaving these inner-city communities excluded from mainstream services, the
fringe banking industry fills in the void. The exorbitant cost or APRs onto the unbanked and
underbanked furthering them into more debt. The fringe banks moved into neighborhoods
vacated by banks, and in turn, the prevalence and market dominance of predatory lenders drove
remaining mainstream banks out of many poor communities.56
In Wilson’s “The Truly Disadvantaged,” 57 He examines similar ideologies to the Spatial
Void Hypothesis; Wilson analyzes the extent to which social exclusion breeds a culture of
53
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poverty. The social isolation of the underclass in the inner city is based on the lack of contact or
interaction with individuals or institutions that make up mainstream society. The social isolation
of the urban underclass upholds the social structural constraints and continues to further limit the
opportunities of underrepresented communities. Wilson defines the culture of poverty as the
basic values and attitudes of the ghetto subculture which have been deeply internalized within
institutions thereby influencing the behavior of the members of the community.58 The social
organization of the urban underclass has cultivated the current-day structural inequality, which is
linked to the contemporary behavior in the inner city by a combination of constraints,
opportunities, and social psychology.59 The development of the urban underclass has been based
upon the social transformations within the inner city. Wilson characterizes these changes as
concentration and buffer effects. The notion of concentration effects implies specific constraints
and opportunities associated with living in an inner-city neighborhood, where the population can
be viewed as socially disadvantaged.60 Buffer effects “refer to the presence of a sufficient
number of working- and middle-class professional families to absorb the shock or cushion the
effect of uneven economic growth and periodic recessions on inner-city neighborhoods.”61
Concentration effects continue to depress inner city communities as continued social
transformations are used to further disadvantage residents. Wilson's methodology on the
inner-city neighborhood can be applied to further understand the social organization of the fringe
banking system and the effects of predatory lending within these communities.
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In his second book, “When Work Disappears,”62 Wilson connects his ideas about social
isolation to the declining availability of jobs. He described the effects of social isolation, which
are social disorganization and the inability to create a sustainable economic environment. The
social organization of a community revolves around one major factor: employment. Individuals
who have proper accessibility to employment undergo a “perceived self-efficacy;” therefore,
they will have the motivation to accomplish goals and develop healthier habits in order to
maintain employment.63 Social organizations are only achievable under three specific
circumstances: (1) The availability and interdependence of institutional social networks; (2) the
degree to which residents can freely exercise their personal responsibility to address structural
issues within their neighborhood (3) the amount of resident participation within formal
organizations.64 The social organization of the inner city will create more opportunities for
employment and relationships with institutional networks, such as the formal banking system.
Redlining is referred to as the ways in which racial segregation shaped the prevalence of
“subprime” mortgage use and is regularly used to highlight racial inequalities within the housing
market.65 Subprime lending deals with credit providers that specialize in borrowers with low or
“subprime” credit ratings. “The primary mechanism connecting residential segregation to
housing finance outcomes is that segregation creates easily identifiable local markets for
subprime lenders to target and avoid; therefore, reinforces the idea that segregation facilitates
commercial exploitation, especially in finance.”66 The same redlining techniques used in the
housing market can be applied to the financial services market. Banks usually participate in
redlining, which refers to the practice of drawing a red line through certain neighborhoods and
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refusing to lend there due to historic and systemic poverty, racism, or lack of adequate
collateral.67 The mainstream banking systems’ participation in disinvestment strategies allows for
the organization of the fringe banking system to further develop; leaving a higher prevalence of
fringe banking in predominantly inner-city and racially marginalized communities.
There is an apparent link between the spatial organization of low-income communities,
redlining, and the fringe banking system. Without the availability of jobs, the unbanked and
underbanked population cannot hold a bank account due to fees, lack of income, and minimum
balance requirements with checking accounts. Job security is the root of social organization. The
highest unbanked and underbanked populations are located within low-income inner-city
communities, such as The Bronx. In order for individuals to fully utilize the mainstream financial
system, there must be more accessibility to jobs first. Social organization is only possible if the
mainstream banking sector offers inner-city communities accessible and inclusive methods to
receive financial services, such as credit-building opportunities, in order to reverse the
disinvestment and cycle of poverty left by the void of banks.
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Chapter 2: The Development of the Bronx’s Urban Plan
The formal banking systems’ consolidations and disinvestment practices primarily
impacted inner-city, racially marginalized communities. The actions of the formal banking
institutions left community members struggling to meet mainstream financial needs. Although
the fringe banking system's initial purpose was to satisfy a specific, short-term financial need,
fringe banking services became the most convenient form of banking in inner-city, marginalized
communities. The lack of spatial and financial accessibility to mainstream banking methods
highlights an important connection between the intra-metropolitan organization of economic
vulnerability and financial services.68 The organization of the inner-city urban plan demonstrated
a failure to connect these economically vulnerable communities to viable mainstream
institutions. “Urban spatial planning and land-use regulation have contributed to the isolation of
the poor by creating a dual structure of land tenure and economy, which excludes the livelihood
activities of the poor from large parts of the city…Isolation is a dimension of deprivation, both
geographical isolation, and exclusion from services, markets, and economic support.”69 In the
case of mainstream banking institutions, deregulation and redlining methods minimized the
presence of formal banks leaving the unbanked and underbanked populations isolated from
livelihood activities such as banking and credit-building opportunities. On average, fringe
banking services are significantly less common in neighborhoods with higher incomes relative to
other economically vulnerable neighborhoods within the same metropolitan area.70 This is the
case within New York City; among all the boroughs, the Bronx has the highest share of
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underbanked households at 30.5 percent, while Manhattan has only 21.1 percent.71 In addition,
the Bronx has the highest poverty and unemployment rates to go along with its high share of
underbanked households.72 Unfortunately, the Bronx’s urban plan has been manipulated to fill
the needs of specific consumers rather than developing accessible methods for community
members to obtain job security and credit. In this chapter, I intend to analyze how the Bronx’s
urban plan has contributed to the organization of alternative financial services and the
disappearance of mainstream banking services. I will further investigate the ways in which the
spatial organization of the Bronx allows for predatory lending and limits access to viable credit
and employment opportunities.

White Flight: The Poverty Trap That Leads to Urban Decay
In order to fully understand the Bronx’s current urban spatial organization, we must
analyze the monumental demographic shifts within cities in America throughout the mid-20th
century. During the late 1940s to early 1980s, inner-city communities experienced an
out-migration of whites to the suburbs, called “white flight,” which was coupled with
socioeconomic decline called “urban decay.” White flight related to urban decay because
investment in the inner-city communities was much more limited once white consumers fled. As
Black populations began to seek refuge from the oppression and terror of the Jim Crow South,
they sought to pursue new economic opportunities in more industrialized areas, which were
primarily inner-cities.
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Millions of Black southerners migrated to northern and western U.S. cities from 1940 to
1970, in the second half of the Great Migration.73 But when cities began to merge, whites began
to leave due to a response to the crime rates and social association with minority populations.
The White Flight and Great Migration can be compared to the “invasion-succession” model. This
model illustrates what neighborhood change represents in the context of urbanization. As one
population moves into or “invades” a neighborhood, the original population leaves. “Once the
proportion of non-whites exceeds the limits of the neighborhood’s tolerance for interracial living,
whites move out.”74 There is a certain limit of tolerance associated with the
“invasion-succession” model, in this case, the limit can be defined as a racial tension or racial
tipping point.75 Besides the racial tension during this time period, white populations fled due to
the proximity to poverty that came along with the migration of minority populations. John Kain
developed the “Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis” to explain why inner city communities decline as
wealthy consumers leave.76 As many companies and industries leave inner cities with a desire to
follow the money and stay competitive, the demand for labor moves away from these
communities and follows the high-growth rate in white areas. This leaves fewer jobs per worker
in marginalized, inner city low-income areas than in white areas; therefore causing workers
difficulty “finding jobs, accepting lower pay, or having longer commute times.”77
In the case of the Bronx, local demographics are always subject to change, but there was
a complete social transformation in racial demographics between the 1950s and the 1980s. In the
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1950 census, the ethnic makeup of The Bronx was predominantly white.78 From 1960 to 1970,
the black population of The Bronx increased from 164,000 black residents to 357,000 black
residents. Within the same ten years, the white population in the Bronx decreased from 1.26
million to 1.08 million.79 As the black population increased in the borough, the white population
decreased. The demographic shifts in the 1970s represent the migration of the white population,
the “white flight,” from the Bronx.
Beginning in the early 1970s, the nation as a whole began plummeting into an economic
recession. By the 1980s, industrial capital largely had fled the urban North for low-wage and
non-union areas of the country and the world.80 The economic decline and urban decay of the
Bronx coupled with the white flight movement during the 1970s economic stagnation. The
shrinking economic and tax bases in American older cities, such as Bronx county, were
exemplified by deindustrialization and the suburbanization of the white populations. As
disinvestment intensified, mainstream institutions began leaving deteriorated neighborhoods with
high black, immigrant, and minority populations; cities, such as The Bronx, became known as
poor underclass “ghetto” populations.
By the 1980s, America’s major inner cities were known for increased urban decay and
depopulation; The Bronx was included in the many cities affected by the disinvestment
post-white-flight. There was a need for “planned shrinkage,” according to New York City
Housing Commissioner Roger Starr, whose policy of public service dramatically cut poor
neighborhoods under the Nixon administration's policy of benign neglect for poor and racially
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segregated communities 81 The Bronx, the poorest Congressional district in the United States,
was the perfect place for Commissioner Starr to begin his plans to “shrink” New York City by
clearing informal housing.“ The Bronx was the target of drastic cuts in fire departments and
firefighting services, which led to immense fire destruction and continuous landlord
abandonment, population displacement, and spikes in homelessness. The ensuing fire epidemic
resulted from the “planned shrinkage” of municipal services in poor neighborhoods, which were
known for being chronically “ill “or in the dying stage of their life cycle. “Planned shrinkage”
was a new and more effective form of slum clearance, which began in 1970 and ended in 1990.82
Through the withdrawal of municipal services in poor communities, urban “planned shrinkage”
was an urban plan which constructed the removal of necessary services, such as banking, to
marginalized, underrepresented communities. As Wilson previously stated, the inner city was
going through an economic crisis with urban decay reaching an all-time high and a lack of social
organization.83 During the 1990s, the Bronx, like many other central cities, was left behind in the
American recovery process. The Bronx became a centralized “ghetto,” with concentrated
joblessness, crime, poverty, and minority populations; therefore, the “planned shrinking” of New
York City exposed The Bronx to predatory lending services to fill the spatial void that
mainstream financial institutions left after the white flight.

Disinvestment and Redlining Effects in the Bronx
As previously stated, redlining is a disinvestment technique used to restrict Black
homebuyers’ from moving into certain communities. Redlining began in the 1930s when the
Federal Housing Administration (FHA) was created to insure mortgages. If a neighborhood was
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deemed as too much of a “risk,” then banks wouldn’t lend there. The “risk” associated with the
loan primarily dealt with the racial composition of the area.84 "Neither the percentage of black
people living there nor their social class mattered. Black people were viewed as a contagion”85
The FHA relied on maps drawn by the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC), a government
mandated institution that consulted with local bank loan officers, municipal leaders, appraisers,
and realtors to create “Residential Security” maps of cities.86 Neighborhoods were color-coded
on maps: green for the “Best,” blue for “Still Desirable,” yellow for “Definitely Declining,” and
red for “Hazardous.”87 “On the maps, green areas, rated “A,” were indicated as in demand
neighborhoods that, as one appraiser put it, lacked “a single foreigner or Negro.” These
neighborhoods were considered excellent prospects for insurance. Neighborhoods, where black
people lived, were rated “D” and were usually considered ineligible for FHA backing. 88
Neighborhoods considered high risk were often “redlined” by mainstream lending institutions,
denying them access to capital investment and credit that could improve the housing and
financial well-being of residents.89
As shown in Figure 1, there were extensive redlining techniques used by HOLC within
the Bronx. While the only area that was considered desirable(green) was Riverdale, most of the
other neighborhoods within The Bronx were either considered definitely declining(yellow) or
hazardous(red). Most of the hazardous neighborhoods were concentrated in the South Bronx.
Currently, the reminiscence of the HOLC redlining practices remain present in the Bronx. There
is significantly greater economic inequality in areas where the HOLC deemed as “hazardous”
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and are currently minority neighborhoods. To a lesser extent this is also true of areas where more
of the HOLC low-risk, or “Desirable” areas have remained white.90 This currently stands true in
the Bronx, “While the poorest of the nation’s 435 congressional districts is located in the Bronx,
it is also home to some affluent and middle-class communities, including Riverdale…”91 In
addition to location, the economic inequality left by HOLC redlining can also be depicted
through the poverty concentrations in the Bronx. While the poverty rate in South Bronx
neighborhoods, such as Morris Heights, Hunts Point and the Grand Concourse, were nearly 40
percent in 2016; Riverdale and Co-op City areas were below citywide average poverty rate,
which was around 18.4 percent in 2016.92 It is evident that most affluent-white individuals who
still inhabit the Bronx live in Riverdale, while the majority of poverty concentration is found
within the South Bronx. Current-day rate of job growth and investment in the Bronx can also be
attributed to the effects of HOLC redlining. For instance, while job growth remains slow in the
Grand Concourse at 13 percent, the combined areas of Belmont, Pelham Parkway and Riverdale
accounted for one-third of the private sector job gains in the Bronx between 2007 and 2017.93
The Federal Housing Authority’s usage of HOLC maps to construct lending guidelines left a
legacy of redlining in the Bronx neighborhoods; thus, influencing the spatial organization of the
Bronx urban’s plan.
The Federal Housing Authority used redlining to disinvest in inner-city communities, but
furthered investment in predominantly white-populated areas, such as suburbs. The FHA
subsidized the construction of entire suburbs, which included 85 percent of New York-area
subdivisions built during the 1930s to 1940s, with explicit restrictive covenants preventing the
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sale of homes to African-Americans. 94 “The underwriting manual of the Federal Housing
Administration said that incompatible racial groups should not be permitted to live in the same
communities, meaning that loans to African-Americans could not be insured.” 95 The FHA policy
displayed the federal government losing interest in the city as banks became hesitant to finance
mortgages within the five boroughs in New York City. The FHA’s redlining techniques
influenced the disinvestment within the Bronx’s urban plan.
During and after World War II, industries and jobs moved regionally from city centers to
suburbs; As I mentioned, this was the prevalent case within New York. Residential
suburbanization left inner city centers disenfranchised. The decline in urban investment within
the inner city led to formal banking institutions taking deposits in older city cores but refusing to
invest in working class and poor areas, such as the South Bronx.96 White populations of the
working class moved to suburbs or the North Bronx as Puerto Rican and African Americans
were subjected to the declining South Bronx due to predatory real-estate practices.97 Redlining
made it so residents could not get insurance or mortgages and landlords had no incentive to
invest in their properties. “The lack of financing led many landlords to focus on short-term
profits (or sell their buildings to people who were willing to follow this model), neglecting
maintenance, stripping buildings of plumbing and appliances, and sometimes even burning the
building down for fire insurance.”98
In the 1960s, urban renewal projects led to the deindustrialization of the South Bronx
causing a movement of jobs, people and capital out of the “ghetto.” Deindustrialization made it
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difficult for minority populations in the South Bronx to find good-paying jobs.99 As white
workers left, the growing gap between tenant incomes and housing costs increased. Low wages
and joblessness ravaged neighborhoods in the South Bronx, leaving tenants with barley enough
to make ends meet.
New York City’s fiscal crisis in the 1970s created conditions that allowed furthered
disinvestment in the Bronx. During the 1970s housing costs went up due to rising oil costs, high
interest rates and inflation.100 The disinvestment of individual buildings by landlords and private
interests, such as banks and businesses disinvestment, was intensified by city policies made in
response to the fiscal crisis and reflected the city’s inability to draw enough revenues to cover its
expenditures.101 “FHA mortgage insurance allowed local banks to make non-local mortgages
with much less risk. Deregulation and redlining led Bronx banks to make very few investments
in the borough after 1966. In 1975, Dollar Savings Bank, which was the largest bank in the
Bronx and the fifth largest savings bank in the country, made only 32 mortgages in all of the
Bronx.”102 “In 1975, Congress passed the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, requiring banks to
make public the data on all home loan applications including race, income, and neighborhood of
the applicant, and whether the loan was approved or denied.”103 This act highlighted the bank
disinvestment and redlining practices, which left a gap in banking that would be filled by the
overwhelming amount of check cashers, pawnshops, and payday lenders. Disinvestment
practices used by policymakers allowed for fringe and subprime financial services to fill the
spatial void left by mainstream banking institutions.
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Bank disinvestment in the Bronx also caused there to be a lack of availability of credit,
which has really significant impacts on every dimension of neighborhood life. For instance, the
terms of the quality of real estate, the willingness of investors to come in, the prices of property,
and the emergence of predatory practices are all direct consequences of the lack of affordable
loans and job availability.104 The legacy of this banking disinvestment contributes to income
inequality and inaccessible credit opportunities within the Bronx today; In 2017, 24 out of 25 of
the Bronx’s zip codes were credit-constrained or were neighborhoods where access to credit for
economic opportunity is depressed.105 Although the Bronx has come a long way since this initial
disinvestment, there remains much work to be done. The Bronx’s unemployment rate is
extremely high, and residents continue to live in impoverished conditions due to the barriers
within the Bronx’s urban plan. Continued private and public investment is needed in the Bronx in
order to produce new jobs. The policy implications made by the Federal Housing Authority and
the “planned shrinking” of New York proposed by Commissioner Starr shaped the Bronx’s urban
plan through pervasive disinvestment, deindustrialization, and banking deregulation methods.
The social organization of the Bronx is needed to aid the reversal of the economic degradation
within this community; but policymakers must focus on the expansion of jobs within the borough
to ensure proper reinvestment.
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The Spatial Organization of Mainstream Financial Systems: Where Are the Banks
in the Bronx?
The Bronx has both the lowest proportion of households with a bank account of any
borough in New York City at 28.7% and the lowest concentration of bank branches per person of
any county in New York State. 106 The shortages of bank branches within the Bronx influence the
likelihood of those without bank accounts, and even some with them, to often utilize fringe
financial services such as check cashers and pawn shops to meet their financial needs.107
In order to fully analyze the diminishing presence of mainstream bank systems in the
Bronx, we must understand the spatial organization and movement patterns of banks within the
borough. As I mentioned previously, formal banking institutions are needed to distribute
homeowners mortgages, provide the adequate funding for business expansion, and develop credit
history. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, some banks had their
headquarters within the parameters of the Bronx. The first attempt to begin a bank in The Bronx
was in 1860 in Morrisania, but this initial effort did not last long.108 The first Bronx-based bank
to prosper was established in 1888 as the Twenty-third Ward Bank. The bank grew within the
borough; by 1907, two new branches opened. In the economic upturn of the 1920s, the
Twenty-third Ward Bank was converted into the Bronx County Trust Company. Demographic
shifts promoted the arrival of new homeowners to The Bronx, which allowed for the
establishment of the first savings bank in the borough, the Dollar Savings Bank, in 1900.109 The
new formal banking institutions flourished momentarily, but these banks either failed in the
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1930s Depression or were later merged into larger metropolitan banks due to the lack of
investment within the community. No Bronx-based bank now remains.110
The cycle of financial crises contributed to the importance of lending institutions in the
overall health of the economy. In addition to the Great Depression of the 1930s, the fiscal crisis
in New York City during 1975 heavily impacted banking infrastructure within the Bronx. The
crisis was primarily due to the financial institution's refusal to buy short-term New York City
bonds, which left the city scrambling to cover its expenses.111 “New York avoided filing for
bankruptcy after the federal and state governments agreed to provide loans and other assistance
while the state began to oversee city finances, threatening to intervene if unorthodox financial
practices reemerged.”112 In order to maintain the crippling economic structure of the city during
1975, the municipal government laid off public employees, concentrated the provision of
municipal services, and abandoned many of its extensive capital projects such as the building of
new housing and banking initiatives.
As financial institutions, formal banks have played a key role in the housing crisis and
cyclic recession patterns within New York City. In response to the economic crisis of 2008, there
was a passage of the Dodd‐Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (The Act
establishes an orderly liquidation mechanism whereby the FDIC may seize, break-up and wind
down a failing financial company whose failure threatens financial stability in the United
States).113 The act established the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau in order to properly
oversee the spending and lending activities of financial institutions. Fortunately, reforms were
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also extended to the consumers who participate in the fringe banking system. “The Act instructs
the Bureau‘s Director to establish an entire unit dedicated solely to consumers who are unbanked
or underbanked.”114 This legislation allowed for a deeper insight into the provisions of fringe
banking through regulations on fringe financial services. “Current federal consumer law
constrains fringe banking transactions. The Act increases the likelihood fringe lenders will pay
penalties for violating these laws as well as any rules the Bureau creates because it gives the
Bureau significant enforcement powers.”115 Although certain federal legislation has passed to
protect the rights of consumers and lessen the effects of future recessions, municipal policy in the
Bronx must be enforced in order to protect consumers from fringe lenders. The New York City
Council attempted to consider legislation for a Responsible Banking Act, which would have
determined whether a bank is eligible to hold City deposits based on criteria of meeting the needs
of small businesses, homeowners, nonprofits, and low and moderate‐income residents.116
Although this act was not passed, it displayed the current need for increased bank investment and
support in the Bronx to ensure its economic progression.
Right across the river, Manhattan, New York City’s richest borough, has four times as
many bank branches per person as the Bronx.117 Most of the Bronx’s branches are spatially
organized in clusters around large commercial outlets leaving midsize and small commercial
areas virtually unbanked. Figure 2 displays the geographical outlay of the formal banking
system including different bank branches within the Bronx. As shown in Figure 2, Among the
150 branches in the borough, half are from one of the giant four “megabanks,” which is
considered a major mainstream formal banking institution, Chase, Bank of America, Citibank,
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and Wells Fargo. 38 banks have only one Bronx branch and 70 percent of branches are from
banks with more than $100 billion in total global assets.118 Chase alone accounts for nearly a
third of all Bronx bank branches, made possible by the acquisition of its closest competitor,
Washington Mutual.119 These larger institutions often charge higher account fees (if consumers
don’t meet certain minimum balance requirements) than small community banks. For instance,
Chase, a megabank, owns most of the banks within the region, but only has 5 surcharge-free
ATM’s outside of the branch ATMs; on the other hand, Ridgewood Savings, which only has 7
branches provides access to 100 surcharge-free ATMs. 120
Smaller, locally-based banks are also often more in touch with the needs and more
responsive to the demands of our communities. For instance, Spring Bank only has one branch in
the Bronx, but because of a partnership with Citi as well its membership in the MoneyPass ATM
network, allows its customers access to surcharge-free ATMs all over the Bronx. Citi has also
partnered with Neighborhood Trust Credit Union to allow NTCU members to access its branch
and ATM network. 121 While NTCU only has one physical branch in Washington Heights, this
partnership allows its members in the Bronx to access financial services all over the borough.122
Community partnerships are needed to ensure that these large financial institutions cease
destructive practices and ensure the developing relationships between the unbanked and formal
banking institutions. More banking regulations and policies are needed to ensure low-income
Bronx individuals are being supported by mainstream banking institutions.
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Since the early 2000s, the number of bank branches across New York City has increased
dramatically, new locations opening in wealthy and poor neighborhoods alike were supposed to
offer access to savings accounts and credit that experts say can help alleviate poverty.123Although
the push for banking has reached many areas across New York City, expansion has failed to
reach most parts of the Bronx.124 A large number of areas in the central and South Bronx remain
lacking viable access to formal banking institutions, as check-cashing facilities far outnumber
bank branches.125 The limited access to formal banking institutions, loans, and credit has greatly
contributed to the continued poverty cycle within many neighborhoods within the Bronx. The
lack of accessible routes to sound financial institutions has caused communities to rely on fringe
banking services as their primary method of banking. In fulfilling a branch role for mainstream
banking institutions, fringe services availability of deposit and lending services within inner city
communities has increased the volume of transactions and dependency. The spatial organization
of banking within the Bronx has left holes within the community and has contributed to the
Bronx’s current state of urban decay.
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Chapter 3: A Deeper Look into the Legacy of Financial Exclusion &
Efforts of Bank Regulations in the Bronx
The urbanization process should provide an opportunity to finance methods of long-term
city development projects to achieve proper financial inclusion for the urban underclass
communities. “Financial Inclusion is defined as the process of ensuring access to financial
services and timely and adequate credit where needed by vulnerable groups such as the weaker
sections and low-income groups at an affordable cost.”126 As catalysts for social and economic
growth, financial institutions must take measures toward the financial inclusivity of inner-city
populations. The high cost associated with fringe lending services does not provide a sustainable
way to financially include the unbanked and underbanked populations. Instead, alternative
financial services further exploit low-income communities into a cycle of poverty through
methods of chronic borrowing; for instance, “Because of the high fees and very short terms,
borrowers can find themselves owing more than the amount they originally borrowed after just a
few rollovers (when the borrower is unable to repay the due so it renews for another short term
period by paying additional fees) within a single year.”127 In addition to the direct costs of higher
transaction fees and interest rates associated with short-term borrowing, the unbanked and
underbanked must deal with the indirect costs arising from their reduced ability to handle
unexpected shocks to income. Within the segregated environment of the inner city, any
exogenous economic shock can cause a downward shift in the distribution of minority income
(such as the suburbanization of employment in the Bronx during the 60s and 70s that I
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previously mentioned in Chapter 2); thus, these shocks not only increase the rate of poverty but
intensify the concentration of poverty within the inner city community.128
Proper government and social investment are needed to aid marginalized, unbanked
communities. Policies should be aimed to contribute to economic growth and social development
by removing material constraints on the freedom of individuals to pursue their own economic
interests.129 On a microeconomic level, lack of adequate means of financial inclusion for
households, in this instance households in the Bronx, have little to no ability to build credit
histories or cover emergency critical expenses such as rent, utilities, and mobile phone bills.130
The lack of financial inclusion has severe consequences for the macroeconomy, allowing the
potential to hurt both equity and efficiency by reducing access to credit, which can be essential
for wealth accumulation, entrepreneurship, homeownership, and economic development.131
As I mentioned previously, the decision of the New York City government to reduce
spending and balance the city’s accumulating debt came at the cost of cutting access to
mainstream institutions in low-income areas, such as the Bronx. Disinvestment techniques were
essential to the Bronx’s economic decline in the 70s, such as the closure of many commercial
bank branches and banks’ refusal to give out loans to community members of the borough.
“Despite three decades of efforts by the public, private, and non-profit sectors to develop the
Bronx out of the wreckage of the 1970s, the borough has been unable to advance significantly
relative to the region and the rest of the country. Any economic development strategy must not
only focus on creating opportunities and improved working conditions for individuals but on
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developing the strength and stability of the Bronx economy as a whole.”132 What began as a
chain of fiscal setbacks with efforts of municipal government to reduce costs resulted in the
urban decay of New York City’s most impoverished borough, the Bronx, coupled with the
continued displacement of mainstream financial services for years to come. The Bronx needs
updated city-level municipal policies centered around financial inclusion in order to revitalize the
economy and stimulate income growth amongst the unbanked and underbanked communities.

The Development of the Community Reinvestment Act
Although there has been legislation put in place to aid the disinvestment from the 70s,
such as the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), there are continued lasting effects that limit
access to proper banking methods in the Bronx. The CRA is both a New York State and federal
law that encourages banks to meet the credit needs of all communities, including low and
moderate-income areas.133 This Act and its regulations authorize the Department to evaluate an
institution's performance and to issue one of four possible ratings (1) Outstanding; (2)
Satisfactory; (3) Needs to improve; and (4) Substantial noncompliance. Each institution is
required to define its "assessment area" based on the location of its branches and the areas in
which they make loans.134 The CRA utilizes a detailed guideline to properly evaluate banks,
depending upon whether the bank is a large bank, a small bank, an intermediate small bank, or a
wholesale or limited purpose institution. This framework does not contain any quantifiable
formulas, dollar figures, or lending ratios that must be achieved by an institution in a specific
community; Instead, there is a usage of benchmarks (opportunities presented by a specific
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community, the institution's product offerings, and business strategy; institutional capacity,
constraints, etc.) to determine the satisfactory level of lending within a certain community.135 In
addition, the CRA does not contain any punitive measures, such as sanctions; rather, poor
performance results in the prevention of expansionary tactics, such as mergers or new branch
openings. The implementation of the CRA has allowed for increased lending in low-to-moderate
income neighborhoods and allowed communities that were once redlined to responsibly use
credit. CRA loans have been considered profitable; for instance, “CRA-covered retail lending
institutions. Eighty-two percent of respondents reported that CRA home purchase and
refinancing loans were profitable, and 56 percent reported that CRA loans were generally as
profitable as other home purchasing and refinancing loans.”136 The continued effectiveness of the
CRA depends on expanding legislation to reach nonbanks and its service area focus to serve the
unbanked and underbanked populations.
Although the Community Reinvestment Act was supposed to be used as an investment
tool to improve housing and bring private financing back to the disadvantaged in the Bronx;
there are limitations to the law that have prevented the full reinvestment into low-income Bronx
neighborhoods. Therefore, Does the CRA actually work for the deposits of the Bronx community
and their financial wellbeing? The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s working definition
of financial well-being includes control over day-to-day finances, capacity to absorb shocks,
being on track to meet financial goals, and having the financial freedom to make choices.137 To
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an extent, the Community Reinvestment Act has helped the Bronx, but there are many
limitations that have caused stress to the community members’ financial well-being; therefore,
there is a need to strengthen the CRA. Community-led reinvestment by the public and private
sectors is needed today to reverse the economic degradation within the Bronx.

Credit Inclusion and Accessibility in the Bronx
The financial inclusion of the unbanked and underbanked populations relies on the
accessible means to credit-building opportunities. “Households with impaired credit, reflected by
bouncing checks, working with a credit counselor, or being referred to a collection agency for
failure to pay bills on time, are more likely to use payday loans and fringe banking services.”138
Since mainstream credit services are only offered by formal banking institutions, which are
associated with high minimum balances and overwhelming overdraft fees, many people remain
unbanked and underbanked; therefore lacking access to develop a credit history. “There are
660,000 households in the NY metro area without access to a bank account. The rates of
unbanked households are much higher for people of color and low-income households: 14.9% of
Black households and 18% of Hispanic households are unbanked, versus 6% for Asian
households and 3% for White households. 29% of households earning less than $15,000 and
21.2% of households earning $15,000-$30,000 are unbanked. 30% of households without a high
school degree are unbanked.”139 African American and Latino consumers depend on fringe
lending systems more frequently than their white counterparts. Both groups also use credit cards
at a lower rate than whites.140 The banking activities, such as developing credit, that traditional
138

Stegman and Faris, “Payday Lending: A Business Model that Encourages Chronic Borrowing,”:16
Jaime Weisberg, “Modern-Day Redlining:The Burden on Underbanked and Excluded Communities in New
York,” (2020),
https://www.congress.gov/116/meeting/house/110580/witnesses/HHRG-116-BA15-Wstate-WeisbergJ-20200306.pdf
140
Jim Hawkins and Tiffany C. Penner, “Advertising Injustices: Marketing Race and Credit in America,” Emory
Law Journal, Vol. 70, No. 1619 (2021): 1628, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3924970.
139

38

mainstream services offer will allow for the most cost-effective debt option for low-income
inner-city populations; therefore, individuals who are unbanked or underbanked need accessible
routes to mainstream institutions. For these low-income individuals, access to credit is likely to
be a larger component of their financial portfolio than income and net wealth. There is a
correlation between the exclusion from mainstream banks, such as deprivation of credit
opportunities, and the use of fringe banking.
Among the boroughs, the Bronx has the most neighborhoods (17 zip codes) that are
identified as broadly credit-constrained. Credit inclusion in the Bronx remains among the
weakest in the nation; nearly 333,000 residents remain outside the mainstream credit economy.141
In addition, within The Bronx alone there are unbanked rates of over twenty percent; therefore,
leaving a huge number of the Bronx population without access to a viable, credit-building
financial institution.142 These statistics display that there is a crucial need for the underbanked
and unbanked in the Bronx to gain viable access to mainstream financial institutions. Although
the majority of the Bronx population makes limited income, this does not mean they should fully
depend on fringe banking services. Individuals still need mainstream banking in order to pay
their bills and develop sound credit. As traditional banking services are profit-maximizing
institutions, we must turn to policy to fully understand the choices and circumstances of the
Bronx's population, we must explore the demographics and policies imposed within this region.

Current Bronx Demographic Statistics and Banking Policy Implications
In order to fully understand the need for accessible mainstream financial services in the
Bronx, we must take a deeper look into the makeup of the population. The population of the
141
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Bronx based on the 2020 census is 1,435,070.143 In Figure 3, we are able to see the racial
composition of this population. As noted, both the “Black or African-American” and “Some
Other Race” (mainly Hispanic) compose most of the Bronx’s population. As I mentioned in
Chapter 1, there is a correlation between the placement of fringe banking services and
marginalized communities, which explains the frequency of check-cashing outlets in the Bronx.
There is an apparent link between the racial composition of the Bronx and the number of
underbanked population, which can be further displayed in Figure 4. The share of Black and/or
Latino residents within New York City in the 10 Most Unbanked Neighborhoods (7 out of 10
neighborhoods pertain to the Bronx) is 89% in comparison to New York City overall, which is
51%. In comparison to the rest of New York City, there is almost twice the number of minority
populations concentrated within the top 10 most unbanked neighborhoods. Evidently, the rates of
unbanked can be much higher in low-income communities of color. The large presence of
low-income, minority, underbanked neighborhoods within the Bronx exemplifies the desperate
need for accessible routes to mainstream financial services.
Figure 5 details the Household Income Distribution in 2020. From Figure 5, we can see
that there is a range of income that displays 29.1 percent of households making less than 20,000
and 1.5 percent of households make more than 250,000. This figure indicates the high levels of
wealth inequality within the Bronx. Financial inclusion is a fundamental part of dismantling
wealth inequality as the financial exclusion imposed by mainstream banking services drastically
influenced current existing wealth inequalities, such as job availability, stagnant wages, and lack
of available income144 The Bronx’s range of household income mirrors The United States’ range
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in household income; While the majority of the population ranges in a lower income bracket, the
minority ranges in the highest income bracket. In Figure 8, we see that households with incomes
below 30,000 are primarily unbanked and underbanked within the tri-state area (NY, NJ, PA).
Although Figure 8 does not specifically include the Bronx, the highest concentration of
unbanked population in New York City resides in the Bronx (7 out of the 10 most underbanked
NYC neighborhoods pertain to the Bronx). Therefore, we can assume that individuals within the
Bronx’s low-income bracket of less than 20,000 (Figure 5) have a tendency to rely on utilizing
fringe services to meet their financial needs . In addition, Figure 4 highlights the share of
families in poverty within the most unbanked neighborhood, 29 percent, in comparison to New
York City, which is 15 percent; thus, signifying a connection between the concentration of
poverty within the Bronx and unbanked/underbanked population.
Although there is a dense population of low-income households and banks are
essentially “losing” money by staying in these communities; there must be some form of social
investment in order to provide mainstream banking services to the poor in the Bronx. The
investment within local, neighborhood banks can provide a cheaper alternative to high-cost
check cashing stores or money transfer agents. Similar to traditional mainstream banks, local
community banks are for-profit institutions; but, community banks would open more avenues to
creating personal wealth through savings accounts and promote homeownership. The initiation
of more local banks within the Bronx can provide capital for local small businesses that want to
grow, create new jobs, and cheaper methods for family saving accounts.
Community Development Banks would help aid low-income Bronxites to meet basic
financial needs. “The primary goals of the CDBs are to deliver credit, payment, and savings
opportunities to communities not well served by banks, and to provide financing throughout a
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designated area for businesses too small to attract the interest of the investment banking and
normal commercial banking communities.”145 Community Development Banks have six specific
functions: (1) Payment system for check cashing and clearing, and credit and debit cards, (2)
Secure depositories for savings and transaction balances, (3) Household financing for housing,
consumer debts, and student loans, (4) Commercial banking services for loans, payroll services,
and advice, (5) Investment banking services for determining the appropriate liability structure for
the assets of a firm, and placing these liabilities, (6) Asset management and advice for
households.146 If the social investment was placed on Community Development Banks in the
Bronx, there would be an increase in banking accessibility to all individuals regardless of
income; therefore building more credit opportunities and movement away from the cycle of
poverty.
. As displayed in Figure 6.1 there is a labor force participation of 59.9 percent and a 10
percent unemployment rate in the Bronx. Social and Government investment must be made in
order to circulate job growth within the Bronx and increase the labor force participation.
Mainstream financial institutions in the Bronx have inadequately served low-income sectors of
the Bronx community; therefore, if government investment is placed on CDB this will increase
the economic standing of the Bronx. CDBs work as for-profit institutions, but since local
government obligations form part of the CDB’s profile, this will provide a source of
reinvestment to the local community.147 The development of CDB will promote job growth
within the Bronx by providing small business loans, stimulating economic development, and
fostering financial inclusivity.
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As the government is the vehicle to create income growth, the truly disadvantaged must
be recognized through policies that promote financial well-being and economic mobility. “Based
on Keynes ‘General Theory,’ the State has to establish controls and influence the propensity to
consume; but since it is unlikely that banking policy is able to determine a sufficiently high
investment through its influence on the rate of interest, comprehensive socialization of
investment is necessary to assure full employment.”148 Although financial institutions serve as
catalysts for economic and social development, government policy is needed to properly ensure
that investment leads to the maximization of employment. As I mentioned, the implementation
of Community Development Banks will assist the lack of income and unemployment currently
found within the Bronx’s underbanked population. Geof Gilbert(2019) states, “Every dollar
shifted to a locally owned business generates two-to-four times more income, jobs, higher local
tax revenues, and greater charitable contributions for local economies compared to every dollar
spent at a non-locally owned business.”149 Figure 6.2 displays the Bronx’s Labor Force
Participation by Age, Figure 6.3 shows Bronx Employment Rate by Age, and Figure 6.4
demonstrates the Bronx Unemployment Rate by Age; in each figure, the age group 16-19 has the
lowest labor force participation, lowest employment rate, and highest unemployment rate. The
upcoming generation of the Bronx would greatly benefit from the financial inclusion provided by
Community Development Banks in the mainstream financial system. This will give a younger
generation more accessibility to financial resources; thus, stimulating long-term economic
growth within the borough. The issues of lack of income and unemployment can only be
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remedied through required government regulation and stimulation to drive economic prosperity
within the Bronx.
Geof (2019) describes Minsky’s ‘financial instability hypothesis’ which was rooted in the
belief that the current banking system exists in between cycles and that bank activity is
pro-cyclical; therefore, banking activity increases as overall economic activity (economic
growth) increases.150 Although at first banks seek to make low-risk loans, as loans get repaid
banks become more willing to lend; thus, leaving room for risky lending behavior. The banking
sector’s cyclical nature provides a source of instability within the economy. Although banks
create our money, the banking sector’s instability provides enough reasoning for government
investment in a “democratically planned system for money creation.”151 Government investment
is necessary to aid the Bronx’s economic recovery. Figure 7 points to the median current
household income in the Bronx which is $40,008. In order to increase the median income,
stabilize income and increase bank profits; the unbanked populations must build assets, establish
credit histories, and create connections with formal banking institutions. The partnership
between Bethex Federal Credit Union and New York check-cashing outlets was a perfect
example of another method to bridge the gap between unbanked and the formal baking system;152
This partnership provided an opportunity for unbanked Bronx households to stabilize income
through lessen the cost of banking. The partnership was began 2001 and stated that “Bethex
members are able to make deposits and withdrawals through the check cashers’ Point of Banking
(POB) terminals at no cost. These POB terminals are essentially ATMs located within cashier
windows, and customers and cashiers conduct transactions jointly.”153 Partnership with a credit
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union allows CCOs to offer access to depository accounts; although the access is limited, this
form of partnership would distribute the risk associated with payday loans between payday
lender and borrower. Lenders will have more information to distribute loans and insure
repayment; therefore, interest rates should be lower on payday loans and reflect this distribution
of risk. The partnership offered expanded delivery of credit union services to people who are
currently unbanked, drawing more low-income people into the financial mainstream by
counseling them on saving money, establishing a credit record, and applying for loans.154
Although the partnership did not last the long early 2000s, an extension of this partnership
through municipal intervention for the current-day Bronx population will be extremely beneficial
to the underbanked.
Within this chapter it is clear that the Bronx’s current economic state is in dire need of
revitalization. The only way to more effectively alleviate poverty within the Bronx is through the
social and government investment within the borough. Community-centered policies around
community development banks will stabilize income, help households build credit histories, and
stimulate small business growth. Integrating the underbanked into mainstream financial services
will lessen the impact of exogenous economic shocks on Bronx households income; therefore,
stabilizing the overall New York City economy. Further regulation of fringe services is needed
within the Bronx to promote financial inclusivity and help the overall financial well-being of
Bronx residents.
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Chapter 4: Bringing the Bronx’s Unbanked/Underbanked
Population off the Fringe: Public Banking Methods and Extension
of the CRA
As I have previously stated, there is a current need to aid the disadvantaged underbanked
populations in the Bronx. Although the Bronx has come a long way from its initial stage of utter
disinvestment, there is still much work to be done to aid the economically depressed
communities in the borough. The spatial concentration of banking and the low quality of the
fringe banking services have created deepening financial exclusion in the Bronx. Bringing fringe
bank consumers into the banking mainstream requires that the financial impediments that banks
face in offering those accounts be resolved. There have been a number of proposed solutions to
generate income growth and create accessible routes to mainstream financial services and credit,
but not all methods are deemed successful.

Proposed Public Banking Method: Postal Banking
A system of banking must provide: (1) the ability to create money, (2) a range of
financial services, (3) short-term loans, (4) long-term funding for purchases of financial assets,
and (5) housing finance.155 The 21st-century monetary system ensures that each money-creating
institution accepts money created by any other bank at “its stated value.”156 The development of a
public bank system would ensure a “democratically” owned and controlled money creation
institution; thus, specifically focusing on meeting the needs of the people.
One method that has been used to help bring the unbanked population to mainstream
financial services is the postal banking method. Public postal banks provide retail banking to
consumers who are otherwise entirely without access to private retail banking or who had been
155
156

Gilbert, “Who Plans Our Political Economy?,” 141.
Gilbert, “Who Plans Our Political Economy?,” 141.

46

without access to affordable, non predatory retail banking.157 In 2014, the U.S. Postal Service
Office of Inspector General released a white paper proposing that the Postal Service provide
non-bank financial services to individuals who are underserved by the traditional financial
sector.158 The proposal details the Americans’ trust and familiarity with the postal brand and the
importance of inclusivity in the financial services sector, specifically when considering the
experiences of unbanked and underbanked individuals in dealing with fringe banking systems or
untrustworthy financial service providers. The Postal Service could function as a basic credit
intermediary, serving simple credit options, such as check cashing at a discount to its customers;
As fringe banks do not need a banking charter to offer these simple types of credit, banking
regulation can be arranged to allow postal services to offer similar services.
Although the post office has a level of trust and accessibility within inner-city
communities, it does not represent the banking sector and will not properly help unbanked
individuals. The unbanked and underbanked populations need a comprehensive program needed
to effectively remedy financial exclusion. Postal banking would not provide the needed financial
education and planning assistance that families in underrepresented communities need in order to
maintain long term financial stability.159 The U.S. Postal Service provides necessary services to
low-income communities; Although the postal service may have certain constraints when it
comes to profit-making, public banks should operate in a similar way. The only way to truly
ensure the success of a public bank option is to ensure that it has proper means of accessibility
similar to The U.S. Postal Service pinpoint for financial services is through establishing a public
bank option.
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If the Shoe Fits: Applying the Bank on San Francisco Method to the
Unbanked/Underbanked Bronx Population
The Bank on San Francisco has developed innovative ways to dismantle the barriers
between the unbanked populations and mainstream financial services.160 The Bank on San
Francisco illustrates the importance of integrating unbanked into the financial mainstream; the
benefits uplifted the entire San Francisco community and became beneficial for the banks. “In
2006, Bank on San Francisco was officially launched as a joint effort between the city and
county of San Francisco, the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, local nonprofit EARN
(Earned Assets Resource Network), and fourteen financial institutions.” 161 The success of Bank
on San Francisco is largely attributed to its ability to tailor particular accounts to the specific
needs and concerns of the unbanked individuals. “Bank on San Francisco determined that partner
banks would offer accounts that met certain requirements. These requirements consisted of
accepting Mexican and Guatemalan Consular ID cards as primary identification, waiving of one
set of NSF/overdraft fees per year, and no monthly minimum balance requirement. It also
required opening accounts for those who have been on ChexSystems, a program which keeps
track of those with poor banking histories.”162 Addressing the specific needs of the community
and unbanked population, such as lack of identification and lack of income to withstand bank
fees, has allowed for the fruition of the Bank of San Francisco.
The community involvement with the infrastructure of the Bank has also contributed to
the long-term success and usage of the bank amongst the underbanked community within San
Francisco. In order to reach out to the unbanked, the marketing groups made contacts with
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institutions and services likely to serve the unbanked population. “Such institutions and services
include schools, unions, churches, community organizations, county welfare programs,
community colleges, and businesses with significant numbers of entry-level jobs.”163 In addition,
the inclusive marketing strategies that the Bank has used elevated the overall community reach
and helped create a social network within the community. “An array of advertising materials for
Bank on San Francisco’s “Everyone is Welcome” campaign, such as brochures, paycheck
stuffers, billboards, bus advertising, television and radio public service announcements, and
posters. Advertisements for Bank on San Francisco make bold statements such as “Check
Cashing Rips You Off” and “Check Cashing Shrinks Your Paycheck.” 164 The partnership
between the Bank on San Francisco and the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco displays the
success of private and public investment within a community. Both sectors worked cohesively to
ensure that community-based solutions were found to aid the underbanked.
The success of the San Francisco Bank displays a route inner-cities’ can possibly take to
achieve the financial inclusion of the unbanked population. This same framework can be applied
to the current underbanked crisis within the Bronx. The development of a public bank in the
Bronx will ensure that all individuals have access to “basic deposit and transaction services to all
households, as well as plain vanilla consumer loans, such as small-dollar loans, auto loans, and
mortgages.”165 The public bank would be a member of the Federal Reserve system and be
regulated by the Federal Reserve and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau as any other
financial institution. This will dismantle the barriers placed surrounding financial institutions;
thus, giving all individuals the opportunity to build credit, make timely payments, and own a
bank account.
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Although public banking services should be developed as its own independent institution,
providing banking services at postal offices would be a way to provide full accessibility to all
Bronx community members. A public bank partnership with the postal services will allow
individuals to tap into a greater geographic branch network, which would enhance access to
brick and mortar financial centers. The postal branch network already contains the physical
infrastructure required for universal access: a post office in every ZIP code. 166
The similar infrastructure and demographic aspects within San Francisco allows the
perfect outlay of a public banking system that can be applied to the Bronx. Although this will not
fully erase the effects of disinvestment within the Bronx; it will surely aid the Bronx’s unbanked
population in receiving more equitable and credit-building financial services. Through
development of public banking systems individuals will have access to mainstream financial
banking institutions that display fairness and transparency. If public bank facilities operate on
these terms of fairness they will “prohibit certain practices that are unfair or abusive such as
hiking up the rate on an existing balance or allowing a consumer to go over limit and then
imposing an over limit fee.”167 If public bank facilities operate on the means of transparency then
“the rates and fees on credit cards will be more transparent so consumers can understand how
much they are paying for their credit card and can compare different cards.”168 Redlining and
disinvestment practices have historically deepened racial wealth gaps that existed in the Bronx,
but the proposed method of a public banking option will open new doors for the financially
excluded and provide a needed form of urban renewal in the Bronx.
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Strengthening the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA)
Although the enactment of the Community Reinvestment Act(CRA) has been successful
to the extent that it incentivized mainstream financial institutions to reevaluate lending
opportunities in low-income neighborhoods, the CRA is not doing enough to address the credit
needs of residents and businesses owners of low-income, inner-city neighborhoods.169 The
changing consumer financial services landscape since the CRA was designed, requires further
adaptations to ensure that the CRA is upholding the economic well-being of its community
members. Current CRA regulations prioritize loans to gentrifiers. As low-income neighborhoods,
such as the Bronx, become rapidly gentrified by young professionals, the displacement of
low-income households becomes more apparent. “Under the geographic distribution test in the
current CRA framework, banks receive positive consideration for home mortgage and consumer
loans made in LMI areas, even if they are made to middle- or upper-income individuals or
families.”170 As gentrifiers buy homes within these poor communities, CRA regulators take loans
to gentrifiers into account when they evaluate banks. The CRA is not properly serving
low-income communities; while residents face displacement, banks receive limited
repercussions.
In order to ensure the continued accessibility of loans to low-income communities, the
CRA must hold banks accountable. “Any financial institution that provides essential consumer
products must make that product available in a fair and transparent manner to low-tomoderate-income consumers in all communities in all broad geographies in which the entity does
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more than an incidental amount of business in the product.”171 Amendments to the CRA must
include specific strides within transparency and fairness to ensure that low-income consumers
are being properly included within the mainstream banking system. All customers, regardless of
income, must be provided with accurate information on the terms of products, and clear
information about associated risks with lending.172
Although the CRA has made some strides in bringing financial inclusivity to
marginalized neighborhoods, there is more work to be done, specifically within the Bronx. The
CRA has not adequately addressed the issues of low-income consumers in the Bronx, and Bronx
residents are taking note of the CRA’s failures. Jumelia Abrahamson, a Bronxite and Director of
Programs at University Neighborhood Housing Program, serves as an advocate for the reform of
the Community Reinvestment Act. The University Neighborhood Housing Program is a
community-based nonprofit that focuses on the displacement of Bronx residents and the
reduction of income inequality within the borough. Abrahamson proposes a reform of the CRA
to properly include the disenfranchised underbanked population. She stresses the importance of
three fundamental principles to adequately integrate the underbanked into the mainstream
economy: (1) Banks should be evaluated on the basis of whether they serve the financial needs of
the communities they serve (specifically minority populations and low-to moderate income
people), (2) Community input and needs must be the foundation of the CRA rather than the
needs of the banks, (3) Banks must establish place-based commitments in order to ensure
accessible methods to mainstream banking.173 Without these specific amendments, the CRA is
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limited and will not properly address the issues the disenfranchised communities continue to
face.
Although certain public banking methods are not as successful as others, financial
inclusion methods are needed in order to rebuild the Bronx. Without prompt social and
government investment, Bronx residents will continue to face deeper disenfranchisement. There
needs to be extensive investment within the borough through public banking methods and the
extension of the CRA to ensure that Bronx residents’ are protected from predatory lending
practices. The application of the Bank on San Francisco methods within the Bronx will promote
the financial revitalization of the economy by stimulating job growth, stabilizing income, and
expanding credit-building opportunities for low-income minority residents.
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Conclusion
Throughout this paper, I have discussed the current predicament of the unbanked and
underbanked populations' reliance on fringe services within the Bronx. Although fringe services
initially were proposed to finance short-term financial needs, fringe banking has become the
primary method of banking for unbanked populations. This dependency on Alternative Financial
Services(AFS) in the Bronx has stemmed from the disinvestment and redlining tactics that
occurred during the 1970s. Currently, fringe banking services outnumber mainstream bank
branches in the Bronx. The legacy of banking disinvestment and redlining in the Bronx has
contributed to the wealth disparities, lack of income, lack of small businesses growth, and lack of
accessible routes to mainstream institutions.
The current economic state of peril within the Bronx has been dependent on multiple
factors. The urbanization process of the Bronx has failed to properly create accessible methods to
mainstream institutions, such as banks. The spatial organization of mainstream institutions
deprives Bronx residents of fundamental social networks and has led to the economic
degradation of many Bronx neighborhoods. The lack of social and government investment has
led to the disenfranchisement of local institutions; therefore, creating a barrier for Bronx
residents to reach their financial needs. There needs to be more financial inclusive investment in
order to aid the Bronx’s high poverty, unemployment, and underbanked levels.
A public banking system would redistribute wealth and financial accessibility to Bronx
households. If the Bronx follows the San Francisco model of private and public partnership,
unbanked and underbanked populations have the potential to integrate into the mainstream
economy by building credit and earning more income. Public banks, as inclusive public service,
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will provide individuals with the proper financial instruments to accumulate wealth and better
their financial well-being. As shown in Figure 4, there is a correlation between underbanked
populations and concentration of minority groups. This shows that there is a racial bias
associated with the overwhelming presence of AFS within the Bronx. Wherever minority groups
are concentrated, that’s where fringe banking services thrive. Without the proper extension of the
regulation, the Bronx community remains vulnerable to predatory lending services. In order to
ensure that public banks function effectively there must be restrictions placed on fringe banking
services and profit-driven banks through the extension of the CRA. The CRA must be updated to
ensure that low-income minority populations are being adequately included within the
mainstream financial system. Although there is still much work to be done in the Bronx to ensure
economic mobility, public banking would be the necessary first step to get the unbanked off the
fringe.
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Appendix
Figure 1. 1938 Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC) Redlining Map of the Bronx
Source: https://www.nycurbanism.com/blog/2020/6/8/mapmondays-holc-redlining-maps
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Figure 2. Bank Branches in the Bronx, 2018
Source: https://unhp.org/pdf/FINAL_Guide_to_Banking_in_the_Bronx_English_2018_Online.pdf
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Figure 3. Bronx Population by Race Total (2019)
Source: https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?tid=ACSST5Y2019.B03002&g=0600000US3600508510

Figure 4. Characteristics of the 10 Most Unbanked Neighborhoods Areas Compared to
NYC Overall (2019)
Source: https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/dca/downloads/pdf/partners/Research-UnbankedNYC-2019Data.pdf
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Figure 5. Household Income Distribution in the Bronx (2020)
Source: https://furmancenter.org/neighborhoods/view/the-bronx

Figure 6.1 Bronx Labor Statistics (2019)
Source: https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?tid=ACSST5Y2019.S2301&g=0600000US3600508510
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Figure 6.2 Bronx Labor Force Participation by Age (2019)
Source: https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?tid=ACSST5Y2019.S2301&g=0600000US3600508510

Figure 6.3 Bronx Employment Rate by Age (2019)
Source: https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?tid=ACSST5Y2019.S2301&g=0600000US3600508510
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Figure 6.4 Bronx Unemployment Rate by Age (2019)
Source: https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?tid=ACSST5Y2019.S2301&g=0600000US3600508510

Figure 7. Bronx Income by Household Type (2019)
Source: https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?tid=ACSST5Y2019.S1901&g=0600000US3600508510
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Figure 8. Unbanked and underbanked for New York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-NJ-PA
(2017)
Source:https://economicinclusion.gov/surveys/2017household/documents/tabular-results/2017_banking_status
_New_York_Newark_Jersey_City_NY_NJ_PA.pdf
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